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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
ANTITRUST 
PRICE FIXING. The plaintiffs were purchasers of 
Roundup Ready soybean seeds and Yieldgard corn seeds. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the seed producers conspired to fix the 
price of these seeds by charging a “technology fee” premium 
on the seeds. One of the plaintiffs purchased their seed from a 
supplier but the supplier collected the technology fee and paid 
it to the defendant seed producers. The defendants filed for 
summary judgment and argued that this purchaser could not 
file an antitrust claim under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, 
because the plaintiff did not purchase the seed directly from 
the defendants. The court denied summary judgment based on 
issues of fact remaining as to whether the plaintiff could be 
considered as having purchased the seeds from either the 
defendants directly or through the supplier as an agent of the 
defendants. Sample v. Monsanto Co., 283 F. Supp.2d 1088 
(E.D. Mo. 2003). 
BANKRUPTCY 
CHAPTER 12 
LEGISLATION. Although a bill, S. 1920, to extend 
Chapter 12 was passed by the U.S. Sentate, the U.S. House of 
Representatives did not act on the measure; therefore, the 
Chapter 12 bankruptcy provisions expired on December 31, 
2003. 
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS 
EGGS. The FSIS and the AMS have transferred the 
regulations governing the voluntary inspection of egg products 
from 7 CFR Part 55 to 9 CFR Part 592 to reflect that this program 
has been transferred to FSIS. 69 Fed. Reg. 1647 (Jan. 12, 2004). 
MEAT INSPECTION. The FSIS has issued interim final 
regulations on meat produced by advanced meat recovery 
(AMR) systems. The new regulation is a prophylactic measure 
designed, in part, to prevent human exposure to the Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) agent by ensuring that AMR 
systems are not a means of introducing central nervous system 
tissue into product labeled as “meat.” In particular, the 
regulations provide that skulls and vertebral column bones of 
cattle 30 months of age and older cannot be used in AMR 
systems. In addition to the measures related to BSE, the 
regulations finalize restrictions related to bone solids and bone 
marrow for livestock products. The regulation articulates the 
criteria that FSIS will use to ensure that AMR products can be 
represented as “meat” and thus are not adulterated or misbranded. 
Finally, the regulations require that federally inspected 
establishments that process the carcasses or parts of cattle 
develop, implement, and maintain written procedures for the 
removal, segregation, and disposition of specified risk materials 
(SRMs), including non-complying product from beef AMR 
systems. Establishments must incorporate these procedures into 
their HACCP plans or in their sanitation SOPs or other 
prerequisite program. 69 Fed. Reg. 1874 (Jan. 12, 2004). 
The FSIS has issued interim regulations amending the federal 
meat inspection regulations to designate the brain, skull, eyes, 
trigeminal ganglia, spinal cord, vertebral column (excluding the 
vertebrae of the tail, the transverse processes of the thoracic 
and lumbar vertebrae, and the wings of the sacrum), and dorsal 
root ganglia of cattle 30 months of age and older, and the tonsils 
and distalileum of the small intestine of all cattle, as “specified 
risk materials’’ (SRMs). The regulations provide that SRMs are 
inedible and prohibit their use for human food. In addition, the 
regulations require all non-ambulatory disabled cattle (so-called 
“downer” cattle) presented for slaughter to be condemned. The 
regulations require federally-inspected establishments that 
slaughter cattle and federally-inspected establishments that 
process the carcasses or parts of cattleto develop, implement, 
and maintain written procedures for the removal, segregation, 
and disposition of SRMs. Establishments must incorporate these 
procedures into their HACCP plans or in their sanitation SOPs 
or other prerequisite program. 69 Fed. Reg. 1861 (Jan. 12, 
2004). 
The FSIS has issued interim regulations which amend the 
federal meat inspection regulations to prohibit the use of 
penetrative captive bolt stunning devices that deliberately inject 
air into the cranial cavity of cattle. 69 Fed. Reg. 1885 (Jan. 12, 
2004). 
The FSIS has announced that it will no longer pass and apply 
the mark of inspection to the carcasses and parts from cattle 
that are selected for testing by APHIS for Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) until the sample is determined to be 
negative. 69 Fed. Reg. 1892 (Jan. 12, 2004). 
PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY CONTRACTS. The 
plaintiff executed a production flexibility contract (PFC) for 
farmland owned by the plaintiff and a family member. The PFC 
required the plaintiff to control erosion and weeds on the property 
during the contract. The plaintiff received a notice from the 
county FSA office that the weeds were not being controlled on 
the land and that the plaintiff had 15 days to institute weed control. 
The plaintiff had already controlled the weeds so no violation 
was recorded. Four years later, the plaintiff received another 
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notice of lack of weed control and the PFC payment was 
reduced by $11,448. The reduction was determined by 
multiplying the number of acres enrolled by the average cost 
of weed control. That amount was then tripled as required by 
7 CFR § 1412.401. The weeds were quickly controlled but 
the local office refused to reinstate the reduction in PFC 
payments. The reduction was appealed through the 
administrative appeals process to the NAD which finally 
upheld the PFC reduction. The plaintiff argued the PFC 
contracts were void for vagueness; the enforcement was 
discriminatory or in retaliation for the plaintiff’s having 
previously reported the person who reported the first 
violation; the payment reduction constituted an illegal 
penalty; and the payment reduction was unjust because this 
was the plaintiff’s first violation on this farm or contract, and 
she had already paid the cost to remedy it. The court held 
that the vagueness and the discrimination issues could not be 
reviewed because these types of issues can not be determined 
by administrative appeals. The court held that the payment 
reduction was not an illegal penalty because the penalty 
amount was established as a deterrent to breaches of the weed 
control provision. Finally, the court held that the first notice 
of violation involved substantially the same farm, farm owner 
and contract parties; therefore, the plaintiff had received two 
notices of violations and was subject to a PFC payment 
reduction. In addition, the provision for a first warning letter 
was in the FSA handbook and not in the regulations, which 
provided for a PFC reduction with the first violation.Bishop 
v. Veneman, 283 F. Supp.2d 1207 (D. Kan. 2003). 
FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
MARITAL DEDUCTION. The decedent’s will created a 
credit shelter trust for the surviving spouse with a remainder 
to the decedent’s children. The remainder of the estate passed 
to the surviving spouse. The spouse, as executor, mistakenly 
underfunded the credit shelter trust and included that 
underfunding amount in the residual estate bequest to the 
spouse. The estate made a QTIP election with respect to the 
trust; however, the election was not necessary because the 
election did not reduce the federal estate tax liability of the 
estate. The IRS ruled that, under Rev. Proc. 2001-38, 2001-1 
C.B. 1335, the QTIP election would be disregarded for 
purposes of including the trust property in the surviving 
spouse’s estate. Ltr. Rul. 200403093, Sept. 24, 2003. 
The taxpayer established a revocable trust for the taxpayer’s 
benefit and funded by the taxpayer’s separate assets. Under 
the trust, if the taxpayer’s spouse predeceases the taxpayer, 
the spouse had a testamentary power to appoint trust assets 
equal in value to the spouse’s remaining applicable exclusion 
amount less the value of the spouse’s taxable estate 
determined as if the spouse did not possess this power. The 
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IRS ruled that if the spouse exercises the general testamentary 
power of appointment, the taxpayer will have made a complete 
gift of those assets and those assets will be included in the 
spouse’s estate. The spouse executed a will which exercised 
the testamentary power of appointment. The IRS ruled that the 
value of the property appointed will be a gift by the taxpayer 
to the spouse and the property will not be included in the 
spouse’s estate. The spouse’s exercise of the appointment 
appointed the property to a family trust for the taxpayer and 
the taxpayer’s descendants. Distributions are to be made for 
the health, education, support and maintenance of the 
beneficiaries. The IRS ruled that the appointed property will 
not be included in the taxpayer’s estate because the taxpayer’s 
receipt of property was subject to an ascertainable standard. 
Ltr. Rul. 200403094, Sept. 24, 2003. 
VALUATION OF STOCK. The decedent owned a 49.04 
percent interest in a corporation which operated a hair salon 
products business under the decedent’s name. The Tax Court 
had valued the full company at fair market value with a 
discount for the loss of the decedent to the company. The Tax 
Court also discounted the value of the stock by 35 percent for 
a minority interest and lack of marketability. Finally, the Tax 
Court discounted the value of the stock by 15 percent because 
of a pending lawsuit. The appellate court reversed, holding 
that the Tax Court failed to provide sufficient support for the 
valuations and discounts applied. On remand the Tax Court 
discounted the value of the stock by 35 percent for a minority 
interest and lack of marketability and an additional 10 percent 
for the loss of the decedent. Instead of applying a discount for 
the pending litigation, the Tax Court reduced the value by 
$1.5 million. Estate of Mitchell v. Comm’r, 2004-1 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,475 (9th Cir. 2003), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 
2002-98, on rem. from, 250 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’g 
in part, T.C. Memo. 1997-461. 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. A trust was established for 
an individual for life with the remainder to pass to another 
individual. The trust owned an interest in a partnership which 
contributed cash to a charitable organization and the trust 
included its distributive share of the partnership charitable 
contributions as a charitable deduction. The IRS ruled that 
the trust was eligible for the charitable deduction for its share 
of the partnership’s charitable contributions even though the 
trust instrument did not authorize the trustee to make charitable 
contributions.  Rev. Rul. 2004-5, I.R.B. 2004-3. 
The taxpayer owned rural land which was part natural, 
partially improved and partially farm land. A conservation 
easement in perpetuity was granted to a corporation which 
qualified as a charitable organization under I.R.C. § 170 and 
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required the land to be used solely for conservation purposes. 
The IRS held that the contribution of the easement was a 
qualified conservation easement eligible for the charitable 
deduction under I.R.C. § 170(h). Ltr. Rul. 200403044, Oct. 
9, 2003. 
CORPORATIONS 
SECTION 1244 STOCK. The taxpayer established a 
corporation to operate a fiberglass manufacturing company. 
The company did little business and was described on tax 
returns for several years as an investment company. The 
corporation owned and traded stock in other corporations, 
although the corporation was not authorized by its articles 
of incorporation to engage in investment activities. When 
the corporation was terminated, the taxpayer claimed an 
ordinary loss for $100,000 of Section 1244 stock. The court 
held that the stock was not eligible for Section 1244 treatment 
because the corporation did not engage in any business and 
had income only from rents, dividends and the trading of 
stock. The appellate court affirmed in a decision designated 
as not for publication. Crigler v. Comm’r, 2004-1 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,126 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 
2003-93. 
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The 
taxpayer suded an insurance company for breach of contract 
when the insurance company refused to pay disability 
payments. The taxpayer had paid all premiums from post-
tax income. The parties reached a settlement which 
compensated the taxpayer for past premiums, past disability 
payments, interest on the disability payments and legal fees. 
The IRS ruled that the portion of the settlement for past 
premiums and disability payments was excludible from the 
taxpayer’s taxable income. In addition, the IRS ruled that 
the portion of the legal fees allocable to the past premiums 
and disability payments was also excludible from taxable 
income. The IRS ruling did not discuss the taxability of the 
interest paid on the past disability payments. Ltr. Rul. 
200403046, no date given. 
The taxpayer had filed suit against an employer for wrong­
ful termination. The taxpayer signed a contingency fee agree­
ment with the taxpayer’s lawyers, who received one-third of 
the initial judgment and an hourly rate for the appeal. The 
taxpayer excluded the amount paid to the lawyers under the 
contingency fee agreement. The District Court acknowledged 
a split in authority on this issue and a lack of authority from 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The District Court held 
that the contingency fee payment was not included in the 
taxpayer’s income because the fee was never a personal ob­
ligation of the taxpayer nor was that portion of the judgment 
ever in the control of the taxpayer. The District Court fo­
cused on the taxpayer’s rights to the money at the time the 
contingency fee agreement was executed and noted that the 
taxpayer had no right to the money at that time. On appeal 
the Second Circuit reversed, holding that Vermont law did 
not create a property interest in the lawsuit recovery for the 
attorney’s contingent fee; therefore, the attorney fee portion 
of the settlement was included in the taxpayer’s income. 
Raymond v. United States, 2004-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
50,124 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’g and rem’g, 2003-1 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,196 (D. Vt. 2002). 
DEPRECIATION. The U.S. Supreme Court has denied 
certiorari in the following case. The taxpayers purchased a 
mobile home in 1982, removed the wheels and axles and 
placed the home on a lakeside lot. Taxpayers added 
improvements to the structure including a 12 by 24 foot deck, 
a concrete perimeter, storage area, electrical wiring, a water 
system, a boathouse, a dock and an electric lift. The home was 
converted to rental property in 1991 and the taxpayer started 
claiming a depreciation deduction based on a 10-year life, 
assuming that the property was placed in service in 1982. The 
court held that the property was placed in service in 1991 for 
depreciation purposes and was depreciable under MACRS over 
27.5 years as residential rental property. See Harl, “Depreciating 
Mobile Homes,” 12 Agric. L. Dig. 145 (2001). Rupert v. 
Comm’r, 2003-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,486 (9th Cir. 
2003), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2001-179. 
A natural gas company’s “gathering pipeline system” was 
held to be depreciable over 7 years because the pipeline system 
was used to gather extracted natural gas and deliver the raw 
gas to processing facilities. Clajon Gas Co., L.P. v. Comm’r, 
2004-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,123 (8th Cir. 2004), aff’g, 
119 T.C. 197 (2002). 
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer was 
the sole shareholder of a corporation which had overcharged 
for crude oil in violation of federal price control regulations. 
The Department of Energy ordered the corporation to make 
restitution payments but eventually released the corporation 
from the order. The DOE issued a Form 1099-C, Cancellation 
of Debt, listing the released restitution amount as discharge 
of indebtedness income to the corporation. In a Chief Counsel 
advice letter, the IRS ruled that the taxpayer did not realize 
discharge of indebtedness income because the overcharge 
amount was taxable income when it was received; therefore, 
the release of the restitution order did not increase the 
taxpayer’s assets but only removed the potential for a decrease 
in the taxpayer’s assets. CCA Ltr. Rul. 200402004, Nov. 26, 
2003. 
EARNED INCOME CREDIT. The IRS has issued a 
reminder for taxpayers that, for the 2003 tax year, income 
limits have increased for the earned income tax credit. 
Taxpayers must earn less than $33,692 if they have two or 
more qualifying children, $29,666 with one qualifying child 
or $11,230 if there are no children. Income limits are $1,000 
higher if a couple’s filing status is married filing jointly. The 
maximum refundable credit for the 2003 tax year is $4,204 
for a family with two or more qualifying children, $2,547 for 
a family with one qualifying child and $382 if there are no 
qualifying children. Military families may also qualify for 
EITC because supplemental payments and combat pay are 
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exempt from the income calculations. Eligibility rules for the 
EITC can be found in Fact Sheet 2004-8, in Publication 596 
and through links at 1040 Central on www.IRS.gov. For tax 
preparers, there is a new EITC information kit at www.irs­
eitc.info/preparer/ and a new EITC tool kit in Publication 3107E. 
EITC recipients may also qualify for free tax preparation and e-
filing through Free File, which is located on www.IRS.gov. IR­
2004-12. 
EMPLOYEE EXPENSES. The IRS has issued a revenue 
ruling involving two fact situations. In the first situation, a 
courier company pays a mileage rate to its drivers based on a 
percentage of the price of the delivered package, which is 
determined by the weight, time and distance for the delivery. 
The drivers are required to substantiate all actual delivery miles 
and amounts received for mileage that exceed the actual mileage 
are included in the driver’s income. In the second situation, the 
commission paid to the drivers is reduced by a mileage allowance 
equal to the number of miles traveled multiplied by the business 
standard mileage rate. The IRS ruled that, in the first situation, 
the amounts paid in reimbursement of the drivers’ mileage 
expenses were excludible from income because they were paid 
under an accountable plan. In the second situation the travel 
expenses reminbursements were not excludible because the 
amounts were not reasonably connected to the actual business 
expenses incurred by the drivers. Rev. Rul. 2004-1, I.R.B. 2004­
1. 
HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS. The IRS has issued a 
reminder to employers that a new code (Code W —Employer’s 
contribution to an employee’s Health Savings Account (HSA)) 
is to be used in box 12 on Form W-2. Generally, such 
contributions are not subject to income, social security, 
Medicare, or Railroad Retirement taxes and will not affect 
amounts otherwise reported in boxes 1, 3 and 5 of Form W-2. 
Ann. 2004-2, I.R.B. 2004-__. 
LEGAL FEES. The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari 
in the following case. The taxpayer was a retired engineer but 
continued to provide consulting services. The taxpayer’s 
daughter was involved in a divorce proceeding which included 
a contest for custody of the daughter’s child. At one point the 
taxpayer also sought custody of the grandchild. The taxpayer 
claimed the legal expenses for the divorce and custody 
proceedings as business legal expenses. The court held that the 
legal fees were not deductible because the legal proceedings 
were not part of the business but were a personal expense of the 
taxpayer. Rupert v. Comm’r, 2003-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
50,486 (9th Cir. 2003), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2001-179. 
LEVY. The IRS has published Publication 1494, which 
contains tables that are to be used in computing the amount of 
an individual’s income that will be exempt from a notice of 
levy to collect delinquent taxes in 2004. Notice 2004-4, I.R.B. 
2004-2. 
LETTER RULINGS. The IRS has announced that section 
(3)(b)(ii) of Appendix A of Rev. Proc. 2004-1, I.R.B. 2004-1, 
62, incorrectly provides that the user fee is $1,500 for a letter 
ruling request involving an extension of time to file Form 3115, 
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Application for Change in Accounting Method, under Treas. 
Reg. § 301.9100-3. The correct user fee is $1,200. Ann. 2004­
08, I.R.B. 2004-4. 
PARTNERSHIPS 
DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE. The decedent and brother had 
orally agreed to combine their farming and oil exploration 
businesses as a partnership with each partner receiving 50 
percent of the partnership. However, one brother operated the 
farm and the other operated the oil business and the partners 
agreed that the farm income was to be allocated to the brother 
and the oil profits allocated to the decedent. The primary issue 
in the case was the allocation of gain from the sale of grain by 
the partnership in the year of the decedent’s death. The estate 
argued that the partnership agreement allocated all of the 
income to the brother. The court rejected the oral agreement 
to allocate the profits from the individual business because 
the agreement lacked economic substance. The court held that 
the decedent was a 50 percent partner and that the grain was 
partnership property when it was sold; therefore, the decedent 
and the decedent’s estate received a 50 percent distributive 
share of the income from the grain sale. Estate of Ballantyne 
v. Comm’r, 2004-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,120 (8th Cir. 
2004), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2002-160. 
RETURNS. The IRS has issued a reminder that taxpayers 
in Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Michigan, Montana, 
Tennessee, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wyoming, as well as parts 
of New York will have a different filing address for paper 
returns filed in 2004. During 2004, for taxpayers in Alabama 
and Rhode Island, the address is Internal Revenue Service 
Center, Atlanta, Ga. 39901; for all taxpayers in New York, the 
address is Internal Revenue Service Center, Andover, Mass. 
05501; for taxpayers in Delaware and Michigan, the address 
is Internal Revenue Service Center, Kansas City, Mo. 64999; 
for taxpayers in Arkansas and Tennessee, the address is Internal 
Revenue Service Center, Austin, Texas 73301; and for 
taxpayers in Montana, Utah, and Wyoming, the address is 
Internal Revenue Service Center, Fresno, Calif. 93888. IR­
2004-11. 
The IRS has announced the publication on its web site of 
Form 990-C (2003), Farmers’ Cooperative Association Income 
Tax Return; Form 1040-ES (NR) (2004), U.S. Estimated Tax 
for Nonresident Alien Individuals; Form 1041 (2003), U.S. 
Income Tax Return for Estates and Trusts; Form 1041, 
Schedule D (2003), Capital Gains and Losses; Form 1041, 
Schedule J (2003), Accumulation Distribution for a Complex 
Trusts; Form 1041, Schedule K-1 (2003), Beneficiary’s Share 
of Income, Deductions, Credits, etc.; Form 1065 (2003), U.S. 
Return of Partnership Income; Form 1120-L (2003), 
Underpayment of Estimated Tax by Individuals, Estates, and 
Trusts; Form 2210-F (2003), Underpayment of Estimated Tax 
By Farmers and Fishermen; Form 3800 (2003), General 
Business Credit; and Form 6478 (2003), Credit for Alcohol 
Used as Fuel. See www.irs.gov/formspubs/index.html.  These 
publications can also be obtained by calling 1-800-TAX­
FORM (1-800-829-3676). 
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SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES

February 2004

Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly 
Short-term 
AFR 1.62 1.61 1.61 1.60 
110 percent AFR 1.78 1.77 1.77 1.76 
120 percent AFR 1.94 1.93 1.93 1.92 
Mid-term 
AFR 3.44 3.41 3.40 3.39 
110 percent AFR 3.79 3.75 3.73 3.72 
120 percent AFR 4.13 4.09 4.07 4.06 
Long-term 
AFR 4.94 4.88 4.85 4.83 
110 percent AFR 5.44 5.37 5.33 5.31 
120 percent AFR 5.95 5.86 5.82 5.79 
Rev. Rul. 2004-9, I.R.B. 2004-__. 
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayers purchased a new 
residence and a family member was ordered to live in the house 
under house arrest within one month of the purchase. The 
neighbors protested the presence of the family member, making 
threats against the taxpayers and the family member.  The 
taxpayers decided to move and sold the house in order to escape 
the protests and to improve the family member’s chance of 
completing the court probation. The taxpayers sought a ruling 
that they could defer the gain from the sale of the residence 
even though it occurred less than two years after the purchase. 
The IRS ruled that the taxpayers were eligible for the limited 
gain exclusion provisions of Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3T(e) for a 
sale caused by unforeseen circumstances. The  limit on the 
excludible gain was the maximum exclusion amount multiplied 
by a fraction composed of a numerator of the number of days 
the residence was owned over a denominator of 730 days. Ltr. 
Rul. 200403049, Sept. 26, 2003. 
NEGLIGENCE 
INJURY. The plaintiffs were corn and soybean growers who 
did not use Roundup Ready soybean seeds or Yieldgard corn 
seeds. The plaintiffs alleged that other crops grown with these 
genetically modified (GM) seeds contaminated their crops in 
commerce. The plaintiffs alleged that they, as non-GM farmers, 
lost revenue because the European community rejected the 
defendants’ genetically modified products and boycotted all 
American corn and soy as a result. However, the plaintiffs did 
not present any evidence of physical injury to the person or 
property of the plaintiffs or any proposed class member in 
support of class certification. The defendants argued that the 
“economic loss” doctrine barred tort claims that are not based 
on physical injury to persons or property. The court agreed and 
granted summary judgment for the defendants because the 
plaintiffs did not claim any injury to their crops from the GM 
crops or seeds. Sample v. Monsanto Co., 283 F. Supp.2d 1088 
(E.D. Mo. 2003). 
WATER

WELLS. The defendant township had enacted a moratorium 
on the drilling of deep water wells. The plaintiff entered into a 
lease agreement with a farmer to grow potatoes on the farmer’s 
land. The potato crop would require a deep water well and irrigation 
system to be constructed by the plaintiff under the lease agreement. 
The plaintiff applied to the township for a well permit and was 
turned down because of the moratorium. The township also refused 
to lift the moratorium. The plaintiff filed suit against the township, 
claiming that the moratorium was unconstitutional as violating 
procedural and substantive due process and equal protection rights. 
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for the plaintiff’s lack of 
standing and because the dispute was not ripe for litigation. The 
defendant argued that the plaintiff partnership had not suffered 
any injury because the well permit application was made by the 
partners individually, the lease was executed by the partnership 
but signed by the partners individually and the partnership had not 
applied for a lifting of the moratorium. The court held that the 
plaintiff had demonstrated sufficient injury from the effect of the 
moratorium on its ability to perform under the lease. The defendant 
also argued that the controversy was not ripe for litigation because 
the plaintiff had not alleged any final township determination on 
the well permit or moratorium and that the plaintiff failed to prove 
that the growing of potatoes was impossible without the well. The 
court characterized the plaintiff’s action as a facial challenge to 
the moratorium as having the improper purpose of preventing all 
irrigation wells in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The court 
held that this claim did not require a final determination by the 
defendant nor an exhaustion of all administrative remedies before 
bringing a lawsuit. V. Jacobs & Sons v. Saginaw County Depart. 
of Pubic health, 284 F. Supp.2d 711 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
IN THE NEWS 
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING. The Attorney General 
of Kansas has issued a letter to USDA Secretary Ann Veneman in 
support of implementation of the country of origin labeling 
program. The AG expressed concern that the COOL regulations 
do not require mandatory recordkeeping of all livestock by 
producers but only relies on handlers and wholesalers to require 
their producers to maintain such records. Letter of January 15, 
2004 (copy available from the Press). 
LIVESTOCK. The USDA is considering a mandatory national 
livestock identification program, rather than a voluntary one, that 
would help track cattle infected with ailments like BSE, Ag 
Secretary Ann Veneman said on January 22, 2004. Consumer 
groups say USDA must require all farmers to participate in a 
national ID program if it is to work properly. “That is one of the 
issues we’re looking at very closely,” Veneman told a House 
Agriculture Committee hearing on the USDA’s mad cow 
investigation. Rep. Bob Goodlatte, the chairman of the panel, said 
it would hold a special hearing on March 5 in Houston to discuss 
a national livestock ID program. AgricultureOnline: http:// 
e m a i l . a g r i c u l t u r e . c o m / c g i - b i n 1 / D M / y /  
efAJ0BElVQ0TM0Fosf0Ab. 
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SPECIAL OFFER FOR

CURRENT PRINT VERSION DIGEST SUBSCRIBERS

Change your print subscription to the e-mail version and receive the first full 
year (starting with your next renewal date) for $80.00. The regular subscription rate 
($90.00/yr) will apply starting the second year. 
That is a $10.00 savings over the regular e-mail subscription cost and $30.00 
savings over the current print annual subscription cost. 
If you have issues left on your current subscription, your subscription will be 
extended by one issue for each three issues you have remaining. 
What is an e-mail subscription? 
On the Monday prior to each regular publishing date of the Digest, the Digest 
is converted to a PDF (portable document file) format and attached to e-mails. This 
means e-mail subscribers receive each Digest issue at least six days before the printed 
version would normally arrive via the US Postal Service. 
The PDF file is a facsimile of the printed Digest and is accessible on all types 
of computers and operating systems. The PDF file can be accessed with any PDF 
reader software, including Adobe Acrobat, Adobe Acrobat Reader, and Adobe 
Acrobat Approval. With most PDF readers, the file can be searched, copied and 
printed. The file can be quickly forwarded through your internal e-mail network to 
each member of your firm. 
To receive your free sample e-mail issue, just send an e-mail to 
robert@agrilawpress.com requesting a copy. If you find the issue more convenient, 
more timely, and less costly than your print issue, just let us know and we will 
change your subscription immediately. 
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